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The appellant argues that the proof shows that the relationship of the children's
parents began illicitly and states that this overcomes the presumption of legiti-
macy of children. She urges on this court a rule which would require the
children to produce some documentary proof of a wedding or a witness thereto
in order to establish their legitimacy .... No one knows where the marriage
took place, and it would be impossible for the appellees to check the records
of every person authorized to perform marriages in the Midwest. While the
appellee's proof is not the most convincing, we feel that when a man and
woman say they are married and live together as man and wife until death
parts them, there is a reasonable presumption that they in fact are married.3 7
While documentary proof or testimony was necessary to overcome the
presumption of a continuation of an illicit relationship begun in the
common-law era, the Illinois Appellate Court has held that it may be over-
come by proof of cohabitation and reputation, even though proof of such
is not the most convincing. This holding, however, is limited to the factual
situation where both parties to the alleged marriage are deceased. 8 In re-
laxing the standards previously imposed, the court was clearly influenced
by the presumption of validity of a ceremonial marriage, as opposed to a
common-law marriage, and the strong presumption of the legitimacy of
children.
Herbert Hoffman
37 Supra note 30 at 407, 210 N.E.2d at 832.
38 Id. at 408, 210 N.E.2d at 833. "If one of the parties to this marriage were still alive,
we might hold differently and rule that some documentary evidence would be nec-
essary. In such case, it would be reasonable to assume that a party to a marriage would
remember where the ceremony took place. .. "
EVIDENCE-EXPERT WITNESS-USE OF AUTHORITATIVE
TREATISES ON CROSS-EXAMINATION
Plaintiff entered defendant's hospital for treatment of a broken leg and
was treated by a doctor who, with the assistance of hospital personnel,
placed plaintiff's leg in a cast. Subsequently, the leg became infected, re-
quiring partial amputation, and plaintiff brought suit, alleging improper
care and treatment on the part of the doctor and the hospital. At trial,
defendant's expert medical witnesses stated on direct examination that
their opinions were based on their general experience and training. Plain-
tiff's counsel was permitted, over defendant's objection, to cross-examine
them as to relevant extracts from standard authorities. The appellate
court' affirmed the judgment for plaintiff and held that the strict reliance
rule2 espoused by earlier Illinois cases be expanded to allow the use on
1 Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital, 50 111. App. 2d 253, 200
N.E.2d 149 (1964).
2 "The law is well settled in this State that scientific books may not be admitted in
evidence before a jury, and that such books cannot be read from to contradict an expert
CASE NOTES
cross-examination of any authoritative treatise that entered into the ex-
pert's general training. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed,
and expanded upon the appellate court's ruling by deciding that, hence-
forth, the use of authoritative texts would be liberally allowed on cross-
examination of expert witnesses without regard to the expert's reliance
upon or familiarity with the text. Darling v. Charleston Community Me-
morial Hospital, 33 111. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965).
By removing the former restrictions, the court has made a significant
advance in the use of standard treatises on the cross-examination of ex-
pert witnesses in the State of Illinois. It will be the purpose of this note
to examine the theories upon which the use of such texts are allowed or
disallowed, and to examine the status of authoritative treatises as a tool
in the cross-examination of expert witnesses.
It is difficult, from the conflict of cases, to say definitely what any one
jurisdiction, on the basis of its past record, will follow as its rule of law
in this area,8 but basically the existing decisions fall into four general
categories.
It is generally recognized that where an expert has specifically relied
upon a treatise or text as supporting his opinion given on direct examina-
tion, he may be cross-examined from that text for purposes of showing
that it does not in fact support his opinion.4
Other courts have extended this rule to permit a witness who has re-
lied upon the authority of treatises in general to be cross-examined from
works other than those specifically referred to, provided the authority of
such works is otherwise satisfactorily established.5 Still other jurisdictions
witness except where such expert assumes to base his opinion upon the work of a par-
ticular author, in which case that work may be read ... to contradict him." Ulirich v.
Chicago City Ry. Co., 265 IIl. 338, 341-2, 106 N.E. 828, 828-9 (1914).
S The trial judges have broad discretion in controlling the extent to which learned
treatises may be used on cross-examination of experts, and this may be one explanation
for the apparent inconsistencies in the decisions of the different jurisdictions.
4 Wall v. Weaver, 145 Colo. 337, 358 P.2d 1009 (1961); Drucker v. Philadelphia Dairy
Products Co., 35 Del. 437, 166 Atl. 796 (1933); Eggart v. State, 40 Fla. 527, 25 So. 144
(1898); Fraga v. Hoffschlaegger Co., 26 Hawaii 557, 290 Fed. 146 (1923); Wilcox v.
Crumpton, 219 Iowa 389, 258 N.W. 704 (1935); Clark v. Commonwealth, 11 Ky. 443,
63 S.W. 740 (1901); Pinney v. Cahill, 48 Mich. 584, 12 N.W. 862 (1882); Winters v.
Rance, 125 Neb. 577, 21 N.W. 168 (1933); McCourt v. Travers, 87 N.H. 185, 175 Atl.
865 (1934); Conn v. Seaboard Air Line R.R. Co., 201 N.C. 157, 159 SE. 331 (1931);
Baldwin v. Gaines, 92 Vt. 61, 102 At. 338 (1917); Reed v. Church, 175 Va. 284, 85 S.E.2d
285 (1940).
5 Reilly v. Pinkus, 338 U.S. 269 (1948); Dolcin v. Federal Trade Commission, 219 F.2d
742 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Morton v. Equitable Life Ins. Co., 218 Iowa 846, 254 N.W. 325
(1934); Olivierius v. Wicks, 107 Neb. 821, 187 N.W. 73 (1922); Laird v. Boston &
M.R.CO., 80 N.H. 377, 117 Atl. 571 (1922); Lynch v. Rosemary Mfg. Co., 167 N.C. 98,
83 S.E. 6 (1914); Bruins v. Brandon Canning Co., 210 Wis. 387, 257 N.W. 35 (1934);
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allow such questioning where the expert recognizes the authoritative status
of the text, regardless of his reliance thereon.6
Lastly, an increasing number of courts,- including the court in the in-
stant case, have been liberal in permitting treatises or technical works to
be used to test the witnesses' competency or qualifications, without im-
posing any requirement that the witness has relied upon the text, gener-
ally or specifically, or has recognized the authoritative status of the work,
as long as its reputation is sufficiently established.7
It is to be emphasized that these standard works are not allowed to be
read to the jury as evidence, and are limited to use on cross-examination
for impeachment purposes. Apparently, Alabama is the only state whose
holdings allow their use as evidence per se.8 The reason for this limitation
in each of the aforementioned rules is that textbooks and treatises are
considered to be inadmissable hearsay. 9 This basis was noted by the court
in the Darling case, and in referring to the former Illinois rule, they
stated:
It is supported by the considerations that support the hearsay rule, but the
inapplicability of those considerations to scientific works has been convincingly
demonstrated by Wigmore.10
Hearsay testimony has been defined as
Salgo v. Stanford University, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957); Denver City
Tramway Co. v. Gawley, 23 Colo. App. 332, 129 Pac. 258 (1912).
6 Kaplan v. Mashkin Freight Lines Inc., 146 Conn. 327, 105 A.2d 602 (1964); Osborn
v. Cary, 28 Idaho 89, 152 Pac. 473 (1915); Briggs v. Chicago G.W.R. Co., 238 Minn. 472,
57 N.W.2d (1953); McComish v. DeSoi, 42 N.J. 274, 200 A.2d 116 (1964); People v.
Feldman, 299 N.Y. 153, 85 N.E.2d 913 (1949); Texas Employees Insurance Assn. v.
Nixon, 328 S.W.2d 809, (Texas Civ. App. 1959); Hopkins v. Gronovsky, 198 Va. 389,
94 S.E.2d 190 (1956).
7 Moore v. State, 184 Ark. 682, 43 S.W.2d 228 (1931); Hess v. Lowry, 122 Ind. 225,
23 N.E. 156 (1890); Kentucky Public Service Co. v. Topmiller, 204 Ky. 196, 263 S.W.
706 (1924); State v. Sands, 226 La. 694, 77 So. 2d (1954); Louis Eckels & Sons Ice Mfg.
Co. v. Cornell Economizer Co., 119 Md. 107, 86 At. 38 (1912); State v. Bess, 60 Mont.
558, 199 Pac. 426 (1921); Burnham v. Stillings, 76 N.H. 122, 79 At. 987 (1911); Byers
v. Nashville, C. & St. Louis R. Co., 94 Tenn. 345, 29 S.W. 128 (1895); Dabroe v. Rhodes
Co., 64 Wash. 2d 431, 392 P.2d 317 (1964); State v. Catallier, 63 Wyo. 123, 179 P.2d 203
(1947).
8 "Some courts hold differently, but this court has long entertained the opinion that
relevant extracts from medical treatises, recognized and approved by the medical pro-
fession as standard, may be read to the jury in evidence." Burfield v. South Highland
Infirmary, 191 Ala. 553, 555, 68 So. 30, 34 (1913). Accord, Smarr v. State, 260 Ala. 30,
68 So.2d 6 (1953).
0 CLEARY, ILLINOiS EviDENCE § 11.10 at 192 (2d ed. 1963).
10 Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital, 33 111. 2d 326, -, 211
N.E.2d 253, 259 (1965).
CASE NOTES
.. testimony in court or written evidence, of a statement made out of court,
such statement being offered as an assertion to show the truth of matter as-
serted therein, and thus resting for its value upon the credibility of the out-
of-court assertion.11
Under this rule, treatises are considered to be hearsay in that they purport
to employ testimonially a statement made out of court by a person not
subject to cross-examination. 12
Additional reasons given for the limited use of such treatises are that
scientific opinion is constantly changing; the possibility of jury confusion
due to the use of highly technical language; and the unfair use of such
texts by selecting passages that may be explained away or contradicted
later in the book."3
Professor Wigmore argues that the two requirements usually necessary
for an exception to the hearsay rule, i.e., necessity and trustworthiness,
are present in the area of scientific works, and thus favors their use as
evidence to be read to the jury. The unavailability and cost of producing
these experts in court, plus the fact that these texts are not written with
a view towards litigation and are thus unbiased, lead Wigmore to believe
that the limitation of their use to cross-examination is not well founded.14
It could well be added, as points in favor of allowing the use of treatises
for evidentiary purposes, that the testimony of the expert is ofttimes in-
accurate and is in itself a form of hearsay. 15
Prior to the decision in the noted case,' 6 the Illinois courts, giving a
strict interpretation to the hearsay theory set out above, restricted the
use of standard works on cross-examination to those which the expert
specifically relied upon as forming the basis of his opinion.17 With two
exceptions, this has been the law on this point in Illinois for the past
sixty years.18 In the states that follow the former Illinois rule, the only
11 McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 225 at 460 (1st ed. 1954). 13 Id. at 3-4.
12 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE S 1690-1692 at 2 (3rd ed. 1940). 14 Id at 5-6.
15 "Unless he is thoroughly versed in that hearsay he is not qualified to testify. The
reasoning of courts excluding inquiries about the authorities, upon the cross-examination
of the expert, leads directly to the conclusion that the opinion of the expert should
have been excluded. If the cross-examination puts before the jury the unsworn opinion
of the authority, the direct testimony of the expert does the same thing, with the added
infirmity involved in his recollection of what the authorities say." Kern v. Pullen, 138
Ore. 222, 230, 6 P.2d 224, 227 (1931).
16 Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital, supra note 10.
17 City of Bloomington v. Shrock, 110 Ill. 219 (1884); Ullrich v. Chicago City Ry.
Co., 265 Ill 338, 106 N.E. 828 (1914); Wilcox v. International Harvester Co., 278 Ill.
465, 116 N.E. 151 (1917); Neiner v. Chicago City Ry. Co., 181 Ill. App. 449 (1913);
Levitan v. Chicago City Ry. Co., 207 I11. App. 384 (1917).
18 The court, in Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Ellis, 89 Ill. 516 (1878), allowed
the general use of treatises where the expert stated that he relied generally thereon;
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apparent exception to it is in cases in which the witness has written the
book sought to be used. This exception is founded in the rule of evidence
which allows the impeachment of a witness by his own prior inconsistent
statements, and applies whether he mentions the text or not.19
The questionable quality of expert testimony in general has brought
sharp judicial criticism in the State of Illinois. In commenting on the
testimony of medical experts, the court has stated:
That class of evidence, however, is generally discredited and regarded as the
most unsatisfactory part of judicial administration. This is with good reason,
because the expert is often the hired partisan and his opinion is a response to
a pecuniary stimulus .... The field of medicine is not an exact science, and the
expert being immune from penalties for perjury, his opinion is too often the
natural and expected result of his employment. 20
The sophistication of modern expert testimony has also been partially
credited with the large increase in damage allotments in recent years.21
Aside from criticism, there has also been judicial action in Illinois, in
the form of Supreme Court Rule 17-2, which provides for impartial
medical witnesses. 22
As to the former Illinois restriction on the use of treatises, the Section
on Civil Practice and Procedure of the Illinois State Bar Association ex-
pressed dissatisfaction with the former rule in their publications in the
Trial Briefs series. Therein, it was pointed out that the "cagey" or
"coached" witness could avoid the use of texts on cross-examination by
and the court, in Chicago Union Tractor Co. v. Ertrachter, 228 Il. 114, 81 N.E. 816
(1907), allowed their liberal use. Both decisions were cited in the appellate court deci-
sion of the noted case as supporting the less strict view therein adopted. See Darling v.
Charleston Memorial Hospital, supra note 2.
19 LaCount v. General Asbestos and Rubber Co., 184 S.C. 232, 192 S.E. 262 (1937).
For a practical application of this exception, see GOLDSTEIN AND SHABAT, MEDICAL TRIAL
TECHNIQUE 44 (1942).
20 Opp v. Pryor, 294 Ill. 538, 545-6, 128 N.E. 580, 583 (1920).
21 "The fluency of the contemporary doctor is a matter of amazement and perhaps
envy to the profession supposed to have a monopoly on the use of language ... little
did the non-litigating public know the true rhetorical masterpieces that come from the
lips of medical experts on the witness stands and how they, as much as the lawyers,
shattered the aerial limits of verdicts in personal injury cases and made hundreds of
thousands grow where only thousands grew before." Kemeny v. Skorch, 22 Il1. App. 2d
160, 170, 159 N.E.2d 489, 494 (1959).
22 "When in the discretion of the trial court it appears that an impartial medical
examination will materially aid in the just determination of a personal injury case, the
court, a reasonable time in advance of the trial, may on its own motion or that of any
party order a physical or mental examination of the party whose physical or mental
condition is in issue. The examination shall be made without cost to the parties by
a member or members of a panel of physicians chosen for their special qualifications by
the Illinois State Medical Society." Supreme Court Rule 17-2, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110,
§ 101.17-2 (1965).
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stating on direct that his opinions were based upon his general experience.
This would preclude the use of texts as there would be none mentioned
as being relied upon.23 The Section called for a relaxation of the then
existing rule, and in conjunction with Supreme Court Rule 17-2,24 sug-
gested that a list of authoritative treatises be drawn up for use on cross-
examination.25 These considerations appear to have entered the thinking
of the court in the Darling case, wherein the prior rule has been consider-
ably relaxed.
The Supreme Court of Illinois, in the case at bar, has provided for the
liberal use of standard works on cross-examination and removed all prior
restrictions upon their use that have heretofore existed in the decisions.
The appellate court stated that the questions asked at trial did in fact
meet the requirements laid down in the cases, but the Supreme Court,
speaking through Justice Shaefer, considered that conclusion irrelevant:
We do not consider that determination to ascertain whether every detail on
cross-examination of each expert witness fits within the rule announced in
those cases, for we are satisfied that the rule is not supported by sound reasons
and should no longer be adhered to.26
As authority for this line of reasoning, the court cited the case of Reilly
v. Pinkus,27 wherein the Supreme Court of the United States, in referring
to the strict reliance rule, stated:
It is certainly illogical, if not actually unfair, to permit witnesses to give expert
opinions based on book knowledge, and then to deprive the party challenging
such evidence of all opportunity to interrogate them about divergent opinions
expressed in other reputable books.28
The expert, the court in Darling continued, becomes such by studying
and absorbing a body of knowledge:
To prevent cross-examination upon the relevant body of knowledge serves
only to protect the ignorant or unscrupulous expert witness. In our opinion
expert testimony will be a more effective tool in the attainment of justice if
23 Illinois State Bar Association, Section on Civil Practice and Procedure, 10 TRIAL
BRIEFS 1-3 (Nov. 1964).
24 Supra note 22.
25 Illinois State Bar Association, Section of Civil Practice and Procedure, 7 TRIAL
BRIEFS 1-2 (Nov. 1961).
26 Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital, supra note 10 at -, 211
N.E.2d at 259.
27 Reilly v. Pinkus, 338 U.S. 269 (1948). Accord, Levine v. Barry, 114 Wash. 623, 631,
195 Pac. 1003, 1006 (1931), wherein the court stated: "The expert witness, because of
his superior knowledge of the subject about which he is testifying may be a very useful
or a very misleading or even dangerous, witness, and as to him the rules of cross-
examination should be liberalized rather than restricted."
sd. at 275,
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cross-examination is permitted as to the views of recognized authorities, ex-
plessed in treatises or periodicals written for professional colleagues.29
As to which books or periodicals will be allowed, the court ruled that
the author's competence is established "if the judge takes judicial notice
of it,30 or if it is established by a witness expert in the subjet."'1
In rendering this decision, the court has effectively laid to rest the prior
restrictions on the use of standard works on the cross-examination of ex-
pert witnesses, and given approval to the spirit, if not the letter, of the
Uniform and Model Evidence Acts,82 which are cited in the opinion as
expressive of modern thinking in this area. The Uniform acts have re-
received limited acceptance,38 but their philosophy in this regard has
received scholarly84 and judicial approval.
The import of this decision upon future Illinois litigation will be to
control the abuses inherent in the utilization of expert testimony in civil
and criminal cases 5 and to assist court and counsel in reaching the truth
traditionally sought by way of cross-examination. While this case was
involved with a doctor and a hospital administrator as experts, the
decision is not limited to those two categories of experts, since the court
speaks of expert witnesses in general terms. By doing away with the re-
quirements that the expert rely on the text specifically or generally, or
admit its authoritativeness, the court has left the way open for an effec-
tive check upon the influence of the "partial" expert witness.
Terrence Kiely
29 Supra note 10 at _ , 211 N.E.2d at 259.
30 The suggestion of the Section on Civil Practice and Procedure of the Illinois Bar
as to book lists in conjunction with Supreme Court Rule 17-2, could also be utilized
in line with this ruling as to judicial notice.
31 Supra note 10.
32 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM LAWS, UNIFORM RuI OF
EVIDENCE 63 (31): "Evidence of a statement which is made other than by a witness
while testifying at the hearing offered to prove the truth of the matter stated is hearsay
evidence and inadmissable except: Learned Treatises, a published treatise, periodical or
pamphlet on a subject of history, science or art to prove the truth of matter stated
therein if the judge takes judicial notice, or a witness expert in the subject testifies, that
the treatise, periodical or pamphlet is a reliable authority on the subject." The Uniform
and Model Code both allow the use of treatises as evidence and contain identical word-
ing in this area. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Rule 529.
83 As of date, the model Code has not been adopted in any jurisdiction, but the Uni-
form Act has been adopted in Kansas, the Virgin Islands, and the Panama Canal Zone.
See KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 60-401-60-470 (1964); 5 C.Z. CODE § 2731-2996 (1965); 5
V.I. CODE § 771-956 (1957).
84 See Symposium, The Uniform Rules of Evidence, 10 RUTGERS L. REV. 479, 646
(1956).
35 The courts do not draw a distinction between civil and criminal cases in regard
to the use of standard texts on cross-examination. Willens, Cross-Examining the Expert
with the Aid of Books, 41 J. CRIM. LAW 192 (1950).
